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Abstract
One of the most famous episodes of labor seeking concessions from management in postwar
Japan was the Miike strike of 1960 in Ōmuta, Fukuoka Prefecture. The goal of the striking coal
miners was to pressure management of the Mitsui Mining Company to rescind over a thousand
notices that would force those affected into “voluntary retirement,” most targeted union members
who were hostile to management. However, there was a lack of unity among the strikers where
the miners split between the “first union” and the “second union.” The first union was hostile to
management and opposed such rationalization measures entirely. The second union was friendly
to management and sought to obtain some concessions while allowing rationalization to occur.
The result was a humiliating defeat for the strikers who were unable to rescind the layoffs,
leading to its end on December 1, 1960. While it was a story of miners fighting for their
livelihoods, Japan’s postwar labor movement coincided with geopolitical rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union. Japan’s defeat in World War II ushered in an era where the
United States exerted tremendous leverage on crafting Japanese economic and labor policy. This
was also a time when the Truman Doctrine urged the containment of communist influence across
the globe. Japan’s geopolitical importance meant the United States needed to dissuade Japanese
labor from espousing supposed communist tendencies, and this was done through anticommunist
campaigns targeting unions. Despite these efforts, there were growing concerns of militancy as
the labor movement reacted to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru implementing anti-labor policies,
the Red Purge, and debates on Japan’s neutrality in the Korean War. Simultaneously, labor
organizations had concerns on the movement’s ideological shifts to the left, thereby permanently
paralyzing attempts for labor unity.
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Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
AFL

American Federation of Labor

Anpo

United States-Japan Security Treaty

CIO

Congress of Industrial Organizations

CLRB

Central Labor Relations Board

GHQ

General Headquarters

ICFTU

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

JPC

Japan Productivity Center

Keidanren

Federation of Economic Organizations

Mindō

Democratic Leagues

Minrōren

Democratic Labor Movement Liaison Council

Nikkeiren

Japan Federation of Employers’ Organizations

NPSL

National Public Service Law

Sanbetsu

Japan Congress of Industrial Unions

Sankoren

Mitsui Coal Miners Federation

SCAP

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

Shuntō

Spring Wage Struggles

Sōdōmei

General Federation of Trade Unions

Sōhyō

General Council of Trade Unions

Tanrō

National Federation of Coal Miners’ Unions

Zaibetsu

Large companies
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Introduction
In the late 1860s, the Meiji Restoration brought forth the modernization of government
institutions, military apparatuses, and civil participation, and the Japanese leaders also pursued
an empire. For instance, in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese established the
South Manchurian Railway Company as its political, military, and business arm in what at the
time was known as Manchuria (part of the modern-day People’s Republic of China). This
enterprise represented not only Japanese interests in the aforementioned fields but also
eventually would bring Japan into conflict with rising Chinese nationalism. 1
This episode was the precursor to, as historian Sandra Wilson coined it, the Manchurian
Crisis in 1931. Although politely termed a crisis, it was a military invasion in response to
questions regarding commercial activity leading up to the Wanpaoshan Incident, a dispute
between Chinese and Korean formers in Manchuria over irrigation rights. Since the invasion, the
Japanese were at odds with the Chinese, Koreans, and other groups living in the area. While
economic interests were critical in understanding Japan’s imperial ambitions, there was also a
social element. With Manchuria under the realm of Japanese influence, the Japanese government
established a program to encourage ordinary Japanese back home, especially farmers, to
immigrate to the new lands. However, not many farmers were enthusiastic to leave everything
behind and settle somewhere else, let alone outside of Japan. 2 The purpose of such endeavor was
to construct a new society outside of Japan to demonstrate racial unity with the Japanese at the
forefront. Hence, the government went to great efforts to provide Manchuria, including the

Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–33 (New York: Routledge, 2002), 17.
Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Oakland: University of
California Press, 1998), 354.
1
2
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supposedly independent state of Manchukuo, a positive image despite other issues plaguing the
region.
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the isolationist United States
entered World War II against not only Nazi Germany and Italy in Europe but with Japan in the
Pacific. In Japan, there was a propaganda effort to convince its Korean subjects that they and
metropolitan Japanese were of equal footing regardless of race and blood. 3 In the United States,
Japanese Americans were targeted for their perceived threat and blood connections with the
enemy. Even though some internees served in the military to prove their loyalty to the United
States, they were in segregated units. After tremendous fighting and the atomic bombs
decimating Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on August 14, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced on radio
Japan’s unconditional surrender where Japan sought “to the dictates of time and fate that we
have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the
[unavoidable] and suffering what is unsufferable [sic].” 4
With Japan economically devastated, there was a rethinking among those in the postwar
government and industry to formulate new economic and labor policies. At the same time, there
was a growing awareness of developments in the international stage. Japan was under American
occupation under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers (SCAP). The powers of SCAP and the General Headquarters (GHQ) were
influential in reconstructing the Japanese economy. While SCAP supported political and

Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans during World War II
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 300.
4
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accessed March 9, 2022, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hirohito.htm.
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economic structural changes to the nation’s current state the GHQ was worried about the
possible communist radicalization of the working class during this time. 5
Despite SCAP implementing policies that “liberalized” governance and the economy,
limitations were apparent as to how far it would want to go in relinquishing industrial power in
the hands of workers. The occupation occurred at a time when the Cold War was underway, with
the Soviet Union and the United States vying for global influence economically and politically.
This held true in the industrial stage when discussing labor-management relations. Historian
Andrew Gordon noted, for example, that members of the Sanbetsu Federation (Japan Congress
of Industrial Unions) had affiliations with the Japanese Communist Party and sought to provide a
voice in labor negotiations with management. In the end, on recommendation of the GHQ, the
Japanese government’s Red Purge of 1950 brought down the federation. 6 Labeling federations
between acceptable labor unions and more unacceptable ones continued to be repeated
throughout the Cold War, alleging that those affiliated with a certain party or ideology may have
leverage in pressuring management.
The Cold War may have had a profound effect on delegitimizing organizations, but such
setbacks did not deter the Japanese populace from participating in policy discussions. During
discussions on Japan’s labor policies, popular movements were emerging in response to other
domestic and international policies. This was not to suggest the populace had no popular
consciousness at all prior to the postwar period. For example, many people participated in
celebrations as the Russo-Japanese War progressed in Hibiya Park. The park came to symbolize
a meeting ground for popular movements, and its frequent usage for political gatherings made

John Price, Japan Works: Power and Paradox in Postwar Industrial Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997), 59.
6
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the police weary. 7 Even when such movements were held for different occasions and contexts,
participation for and against certain policies were nothing new. Another instance was the June
1960 protests against the United States-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) where ordinary citizens
and the opposition parties expressed their frustration against Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s
persistence for the revisions to be rapidly ratified without consultation from other parties. 8 This
episode highlighted the integral role of the populace in mobilizing against a foreign policy.
Opposition parties in the National Diet did not necessarily mobilize the populace. Rather, the
people mobilized themselves into “joint-struggle councils,” established hierarchies from the local
to the national level, and other organizations.
The mobilization of people, whether it would be for the emigration project to Manchuria
or to protest a foreign policy measure, also played a crucial role in labor-management relations in
postwar Japan. In order to understand the history of labor, worker mobilizations, negotiations
with management, and reactions from the government, one must acknowledge how different
players responded to domestic and international developments. Especially in the context of the
Cold War and the fervor for open civic participation in politics in the immediate postwar years,
on one side, Japanese workers fought for better working conditions, higher wages, and more
bargaining power with varying successes. On the other, management fought to maintain the
status quo, weaken workers’ abilities to negotiate, and sustain their businesses in times of dire
economic developments.
The most famous and intense case demonstrating these aspects in labor-management
relations was the 1960 strike at Mitsui Mining Company’s Miike coal mine in Ōmuta, Fukuoka

Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
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Prefecture, Japan’s largest coal mine in the twentieth century. The Miike miners protested the
dismissals of over a thousand miners, which the company used the term “voluntary retirement.” 9
While there was a mobilization campaign to protest against such dismissals, there were also
internal divisions within the miner’s union. It split into two: one faction was hostile to
management and their plans for rationalization, while the other a more management-friendly
union that welcomed any means to end the struggle (commonly referred to as the “second
union”). The failure of the Miike strike was a byproduct of a compromised and heavily fractured
labor movement. It sought to understand its role in the Japanese political and international
climate, which permanently divided labor. The United States not only influenced Japanese labor
policy in the postwar era but also discredited the labor movement for its supposed communist
tendencies.
This essay is not a comprehensive survey of Japanese labor-management relations,
conflicts, and sociopolitical and economic developments during the Cold War, but it addresses
the most important case study shedding light on the successes and failures of the labor movement
in postwar Japan. The first chapter will provide an overview of the 1960 Miike strike and the
developments that occurred around that time, especially during a time of immense competition
between two ideologies and its implications on the movement in general. The second chapter
will discuss American influence in constructing labor policy and organization as well as
promoting anticommunism to counteract supposed “radical” elements. The final chapter will
discuss the ensuing divisions within the labor movement in the 1950s and the movement
understood its position relative to the country’s geopolitical significance.

Benjamin Martin, “Japanese Mining Labor: The Miike Strike,” Far Eastern Survey 30, no. 2 (1961): 29,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3024261.
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Chapter 1. The 1960 Strike at Miike
The Miike strike of 1960 occurred at a point in Japan’s history where political and
ideological awareness among the populace flourished. The years following Japan’s defeat
witnessed workers beginning to realize their material and economic conditions in the midst of
economic reconstruction. One of these developments was the organization of young workers
seeking an identity for themselves within a new political environment. “The blue-collar unions
thus formed were soon joined by white-collar…counterparts, frequently led by university
graduates who had been ‘Marx-boys’ as students, before they learned to conform, sometimes to
lip-serving, but more often…to enthusiastic and vociferous Japanism.” 10 Nascent workers’
organizations were in the process of unifying workers from different industrial sectors to join the
cause. Young workers, most of whom were recent university graduates, garnered inspiration
from Marxist works and appealed to workers to rally this message. This was one of the first steps
in shaping labor organization. However, the notion of Japanism, the idea to raise production in
the service to the nation and gradually improve working conditions, placed the young Marxists at
a difficult ideological position. 11 The Cold War was in its early years and the government’s
rhetoric was hostile to Marxist-influenced positions. Nevertheless, the labor movement grew and
coalesced around the socialist and communist parties.
Miike, one of the largest coal mining operations in Japan was located in the Kyūshū
region. While Miike’s contribution to the economy ended in 1997, the year it permanently
closed, the local economy at Ōmuta, Fukuoka Prefecture based around coal mining for more than
a century. In 1960, 12,822 workers worked there and even after the strike, in 1965, 10,444

Ronald Dore, “Unions Between Class and Enterprise,” Industrielle Beziehungen / The German Journal of
Industrial Relations 3, no. 2 (1996): 157, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23275862.
11
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individuals still worked there. 12 These statistics demonstrated the size of the workforce at that
mine despite the undesired outcome from the strike. The decline of workers before and after the
infamous strike will be discussed later. For the coal mining industry, the number of employees
indicated the extent in which it was an attractive place to work.
One of the attractions was, for the time, a generous welfare system, but it compromised
labor solidarity. Coal miners were given company housing, which was crucial in controlling the
“company’s production system.” The result of this was a low self-esteem among the coal miners
where “each company had its own union, which inevitably weakened the negotiating position of
workers.” 13 The role of company housing was relevant because management often used it as a
justification for controlling miners’ activities, including those in the union, within and outside
the workplace in times of labor-management confrontation and negotiation. A low self-esteem
indicated the limitations of miners’ labor activism. Since there were unions established in various
industries, management saw this as a threat to their economic standing and was less inclined to
provide concessions to miners. This factor became crucial in understanding the strategies the
unions undertook prior to 1960.
The economic developments and policies in the 1950s set the stage for conflict to arise
during the 1960 strike. The coal mining industry was in a comfortable situation when the postwar
government initially enacted policies to favor the industry over oil as its main competitor.
“Through these measures…the government hoped to give the coal industry a period to
modernize, to concentrate production in large, efficient mines, and become competitive with oil.
The opposite occurred…as mines proliferated, prices increased, and coal companies pocketed

Tai Wei Lim et al., Coal Mining Communities and Gentrification in Japan (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019),
49.
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substantial profits.” 14 The intended purpose of the government’s support for coal over oil was to
modernize and optimize the industry in order to compete as Japan’s main energy source. The
government’s preference of one industry over another suggested that the coal industry was in
dire need beyond market forces. The fact that the government was paying close attention to the
industry, urging its modernization and optimization to improve competitiveness suggested it was
grappling with inefficient processes that did not generate much profit due to costs, particularly
the cost of labor. To the government’s surprise, the industry was able to generate profits and
increase production. This ensured coal mining was able to survive on the economic stage while
also limiting competition from oil.
For companies buying coal, it was expensive. A recession occurred that placed coal
buyers on edge over the affordability of coal. “When the Japanese economy went into a short
recession in the late 1957, coal stockpiles began to rise but coal companies attempted to keep
prices high, sparking an outcry from major coal consumers.” 15 From the perspective of coal
companies, it was possible to earn high profits since they knew the government would protect the
industry at all costs from competition. They had no incentive to lower prices—which major coal
consumers protested. However, the solution from coal consumers was not to force the coal
industry to lower prices in the short term, but rather to collaborate with the industry to lower
labor costs.
Coal consumers endorsed a confrontational approach in which coal companies were
looking at dismissing miners influential in their unions. The Federation of Economic
Organizations (Keidanren) took the position that while the coal industry “should not be

John Price, “The 1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute: Turning Point for Adversarial Unionism in Japan?” Bulletin of
Concerned Asian Scholars 23, no. 4 (1991): 32, https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1991.10413141.
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protected,” it was crucial to pressure the companies “to reduce their prices through massive
layoffs.” 16 The solution Keidanren proposed was to eliminate adversarial miners who sought to
threaten the industry, the managerial power in labor-management affairs, and promote ideas
compatible to Japan’s market economy.
The process of safeguarding the coal industry involved rationalization, a process in which
both coal owners and the government had a stake on. Preferential treatment of the coal industry
led to the National Diet passing the “scrap and build” law in May 1955. It was a policy that
eliminated mines deemed as costly in order to “raise productivity via substantial investment.”
Coal owners and the government had different interpretations on this policy. The former sought
to reduce as much debt possible through favorable investment returns outside of the industry.
The latter wanted to weaken the political radicalization of labor. Such concerns were able to
manifest through rationalization plans in order to stabilize the market. 17 The rationalization of
coal mines was essential because it allowed the economically precarious industry the premise of
raising productivity. Knowing that there was no incentive to lower coal prices, it incentivized
profitability. The government was already aware workers had alleged Marxist tendencies that
would destabilize economic activity within the industry, potentially spreading to other industries.
It was crucial for rationalization plans to be implemented to prevent economic
destabilization. While rationalization was beneficial for the government and coal companies, this
process took place even as Japan’s government officials and business leaders were accepting the
inevitability of making oil the primary source of energy. With many mines closing throughout

Price, “1960 Miike Coal Mine Dispute,” 35.
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the country, it was unsurprising that local governments protested the “scrap and build” policy
because they relied on the mines for their economies. 18
With adversarial miners the targets in the minds of the business community and coal
management, it was unsurprising the confrontation took on a political dimension. As noted
previously, young workers who were recent university graduates were inspired from and
affiliated with Marxist thought. The miners and labor organizations perceived to have Marxist
tendencies, something that was a threat to the capitalist system. Economic motives from coal
consumers and producers intertwined with political motives so that there would be a united front
against the Miike union and their affiliated organizations, especially against the National
Federation of Coal Miners’ Unions (Tanrō) and the General Council of Trade Unions (Sōhyō) on
the national level. 19
The support for the Miike union’s efforts rested on the Tanrō and the Sōhyō. Both
organizations were nationally influential in their advocacy for labor rights, with the latter being
the highest organization on the labor hierarchy. Seeing how there was a consolidation of
influence from the labor movement, management and the business community deemed it
necessary to ally themselves against labor. “Both miners and mine owners were thus able to
exploit the political process to safeguard production and employment for more years than the
free market would have permitted.” 20
Rationalization was an opportunity for the coal industries to get economic footing, but it
also gave rise to labor-management conflict. Plans for rationalization intensified, with Miike
miners suffering the most on the issue of dismissals. Mitsui management indicated to the Mitsui
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Coal Miners Federation (Sankoren) that its proposal called for voluntary retirement of
approximately 5,000 employees out of 35,000 employees, with more than 2,000 coming from
Miike. Prior to the proposal, there was a 1953 agreement where one’s family members was to
replace an employee who retired. It covered all the Mitsui mines, but the union strictly enforced
it at Miike, resulting in maintaining employment “at a disproportionately high level.” 21
Rationalization came in the form of dismissals, most of which were directed at the Miike miners.
While management sought to dismiss a disproportionate number of miners from Miike compared
to other mines, whether for economic (e.g. maintaining high productivity) or political reasons
(e.g. the assumption of fewer Marxist tendencies from family members), employment at the mine
sustained in accordance with the 1953 agreement. With the union strictly enforcing it and
management seeking voluntary retirements, it was a conflict between preventing dismissals and
rationalization.
Miike miners were not the only workers facing rationalization through dismissals in the
coal industry. It was symbolic of national trends. An organization in the higher echelons of labor,
Tanrō, convened a special convention on October 5, 1959 to discuss potential layoffs at Miike.
Delegates there recognized that 100,000 coal mining jobs throughout the country were
vulnerable, linking the Miike confrontation with the fate of Japanese coal miners overall. 22
While business leaders from various industries were discussing the possibility of voluntary
retirements of coal miners at the politically conservative and anti-labor Japan Federation of
Employers’ Organizations (Nikkeiren) convention, Tanrō was uneasy at the prospect of losing
coal mining jobs throughout the country. For Tanrō and its delegates, it meant coal miners could
be targeted based on their affiliations with left-wing ideologies and parties (e.g. the Socialist and
21
22
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Communist parties), and rationalization efforts were not showing any signs of waning down.
Those active in union activities or the labor movement without political affiliations were also
targeted. The strategy that they came up with, in tandem with the Miike union, was a general
strike to protest against the layoffs.
Mitsui management locked out the strikers from entering Miike on January 25, 1960,
initiating the labor-management conflict. While the Miike union and Tanrō were planning on an
indefinite strike, its progression was not smooth. Internal divisions within the striking workers
were evident. In order to confront such divisions, Tanrō sought to capitalize on broader political
discontent in Japan at the time of the Miike strike. Its Central Struggle Committee on February
26 saw decreasing coal stockpiles, increasing anti-Kishi sentiment on the ratification of the Anpo
revisions, and the momentum from the Spring Wage Struggles (Shuntō) as increasingly
favorable to the Miike strikers’ cause. 23 These developments gave confidence to Tanrō and the
Miike union to continue striking against the dismissals and grant legitimacy to their cause. If
such situations were successful and brought in a new era of public participation, it was possible
for the strike to achieve success through political discontent that was already accumulating.
These developments motivated the strikers to continue with their cause.
The situation to counteract internal divisions intensified the fight against the strikers and
company forces. The strike gained national publicity with the death of a union picketer. On
March 29, Kubō Kiyoshi died in the hands of a pro-company squad, sparking outrage, and the
Miike union received sympathy. 24 The Asahi Shimbun’s March 31 editorial indicated how the
death and the fight between the original and new unions questioned the legitimacy on Mitsui’s

23
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part to restart production when they knew bodily harm was expected. 25 The death of the picketer
brought into the national scene the precarious situation between the strikers and management.
The involvement of a pro-company goon squad juxtaposed a power dynamic. Strikers and their
affiliated organizations were suffering internal divisions while management was already
consolidating their forces to defeat labor. But the publicity received from a national newspaper
such as the Asahi Shimbun proved to beneficial in garnering support nationally for the Miike
union, blaming Mitsui for attempting to restart production while the situation was not yet
resolved.
As the strike waged on, Sankoren indicated to Tanrō officers that there needed an
immediate resolution. In April 1960, the officers called on the Central Labor Relations Board
(CLRB) for the first time to mediate negotiations between the strikers and management.
However, the mediation plan the CLRB had written up “upheld the company position.” While it
changed “voluntary retirement” to “discharge,” the selection of 1,277 workers for dismissal
remained the same. 26 The internal divisions stemmed from the disagreement about the duration
of the strike. It was true that the Tanrō and Miike union members wanted an indefinite strike to
retract the dismissals of the Miike miners. However, Sankoren believed it would be beneficial to
find a quick resolution. The CLRB began negotiations on recommendation from Sankoren. The
problem was there were minor changes to the plans. While it did seek to facilitate talks between
the strikers and management, its support for the latter remained unchanged. From the perspective
of the Tanrō and Miike union members, that was unsatisfactory.
Despite Tanrō seeing the current political circumstances positively, it was not enough to
counteract internal divisions the organization suffered. Tanrō officers were inclined to accept the
25
26
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CLRB’s plan for the sake of organizational unity, but the Miike union pressured them to reject
the plan while the Sankoren called for its acceptance. Disappointed by the vote to reject on April
8, Sankoren left Tanrō and negotiated with the company on their own prerogative, securing a
voluntary retirement plan and a wage cut of about 3,000 yen. 27 It was a precarious situation for
Tanrō and the officers acknowledged that. The Miike local was not willing to concede, but
Sankoren was willing to negotiate for the sake of protecting some livelihoods, making labor
solidarity unattainable. As a result, Miike management and Sankoren negotiated on a plan for
voluntary retirement and wage cuts. It may not be an impressive feat from the perspective of the
Miike local since the issue of dismissals of almost 2,000 miners was not resolved. But for
Sankoren members, it was a victory because they were given a plan for voluntarily retirement
and a wage cut which was better than achieving nothing at all.
The intervention of the CLRB signaled the beginning of government intervention and the
increasing role of political maneuvering. With the strike continuing and the labor movement
divided, Ikeda Hayato succeeded Kishi as Prime Minister in July 1960, with labor minister Ishida
Hirohide then seeking an end to the conflict to avert a showdown. The CLRB was considering a
mediation proposal that lessened the company’s position. “Initially the Mitsui Mining executives
were unwilling to agree as, in their estimation, a conclusive rout of the strikers was in the offing.
However, too much was at stake for those who supported the ruling conservative party.” 28
Acknowledging the CLRB was willing to take a softer approach on mediation and tame the
company’s hostilities, management was unwilling to agree because they believed the momentum
of the strike was not dissipating despite the fractures within the movement. At the same time,
management knew not agreeing would jeopardize Mitsui executives and their ties to the ruling
27
28
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conservative Liberal Democratic Party for a favorable ruling. It would be detrimental for Mitsui
to oppose the CLRB’s proposal if they wanted to continue securing preferential treatment from
the government.
While management reluctantly accepted the CLRB’s August 10 proposal and government
intervention in general, the labor movement had mixed reactions on this development. The Miike
local, Tanrō, and Sohyō accepted the proposal. However, the Miike union picketers concentrated
at the Mikawa hopper “…were exuberant about the government intervention, feeling that their
perseverance had brought the fight to a standstill and that the government could not use force to
rout the workers, given their numbers and determination.” 29 Labor organizations were facing
constraints on an already divided movement and the need to accept government intervention
even if the rulings were unfavorable to them and the results somewhat satisfactory. This was true
with picketers supporting intervention, signaling discontent between labor leadership and
ordinary workers. They knew the strength of their movement was too large for the government to
suppress outright. Government intervention meant the issue of dismissals could finally be
resolved between labor and management. While labor organizations were attempting to
understand the situation, this was an opportunity for the strikers to negotiate with management
even if the results were not in their favor.
Government intervention for resolving the issues at hand indicated the waning power of
the Miike labor movement. The odds of the labor movement turning the situation around in their
favor were slim. In the end, the CLRB’s mediation proposal was certainly a victory for
management. “Almost all [of the Tanrō officials] agreed that the proposal was unjust and antilabor, but the view that the union movement was unable to continue the struggle given the forces
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against it eventually won out.” 30 It was a somber moment where Tanrō was given no options but
to accept reluctantly. Given Mitsui management was able to consolidate support and backing
from Nikkeiren, the government, and some of their own union members, they had no choice but
to concede. They knew they were facing opposition from the formerly allied Sankoren, workers
were losing morale on a prolonged strike, and the government was backing Mitsui management.
Not all of the Tanrō officials were willing to accept the proposal because it was “unjust and antilabor.” The issue of dismissals and rationalization were still the focus of the movement in the
first place, but the CLRB proposal stated, “The designated layoffs appeared unavoidable, and it
was impossible at that stage to deal with each individual case to establish whether the layoff was
justifiable.” 31
After several months of striking to retract “voluntary retirements” or dismissals, the
Miike strike ended on December 1, 1960 with Mitsui management claiming victory. It was a
time of disarray for those who participated in the strike because they had obtained few or no
concessions and changes. “The original union survived, scarred but resolute, and continued the
struggle to preserve its autonomy. More than thirty years later, it remains active and defiant but
no longer represents the majority of Miike miners.” 32 While the original union continued to
represent workers until the mine’s closure in the 1990s, the strike left a scar on its history for
failing to unite the miners, including those who left for the company-backed Sankoren. The
situation in the wake of the 1960 Anpo protests and the death of a picketer were not enough to
salvage the labor movement and make amends to internal dissent.
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Nevertheless, they were determined to advocate for the miners and negotiate with
management despite having to put their credibility as a labor advocacy group under scrutiny. The
organization survived, but the perception was it did not represent all of the Miike miners. As an
Asahi Shimbun journalist noted, “‘When the CLRB mediation proposal was adopted, the 60
people from the Miike local who were crammed into the back of the Tanrō Convention remained
silent, neither clapping nor speaking. They appeared stupefied.” 33
The aftermath of Japan’s most infamous strike was a time where labor organization and
tactics employed were called into question. The Miike union was not the only labor organization
that suffered a humiliating defeat. There was tremendous disarray in the upper echelons of labor
organizing. The defeat signified an undermining for workshop struggles “within Sohyō and also
weakened Sohyō’s organizational base in the private sector.” Since it was a failed strategy to
demand concessions from management, private-sector unions “abandoned local dispute tactics
and began to restrict their activities to joint consultation and collective bargaining over wages.” 34
Sohyō was under immense scrutiny from private-sector unions because of the tactics they
used and promoted. The unions, although affiliated with Sohyō even after 1960, abandoned
strikes and conflict altogether to voice concerns over employment, workplace conditions, and
bargaining rights. Instead, they decided to negotiate through dialogue with management and
focused on wages to avert more humiliating defeats and receive harsher deals. Not all workers
were pleased with such developments. The original union at Miike was still determined to
advocate for the miners, but with the odds of a successful strike stacked against them after 1960,
it was inevitable that a reconsideration of tactics was necessary.
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Chapter 2. The Cold War: A Labor Movement Compromised
When assessing the Miike strike and understanding the sequence of events, it is important
to acknowledge how the Japanese labor movement in the postwar era structured its compromised
position resulting in the strike’s outcome. The labor movement immediately after 1945
prioritized the reconstruction of Japan. The first labor conference was held on October 10 in
Tōkyō over a month after Japan’s surrender and in attendance were “‘prewar labor leaders’” who
formed the General Federation of Trade Unions (Sōdōmei). Its principles were to reconstruct the
economy with improvements in wages and work conditions, industrial organizations, and to
maintain autonomy from political affiliation. 35 Initially, Sōdōmei, along with similar
organizations, was not an organization seeking to invigorate workers for improving wages and
work conditions. It was one stressing cooperation with business representatives to assist in the
country’s economic reconstruction. The fact that “‘prewar labor leaders’” attended and the
organization desired political autonomy suggested the sole focus of movement’s aims were
economic but it may not have the infrastructure necessary for long-term advocacy.
Another development that coincided with the establishment of labor organizations took
place across the Pacific, on American soil. While divisions from the prominent labor
organizations in the United States existed, they had formulated a plan to influence the labor
movement in Japan. “The International Affairs Departments of the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)” indicated their intentions to “reengineer Japan” and were willing to cooperate with SCAP in constructing labor policy. 36 For
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these parties, it was an idealist undertaking that Japanese labor policy should mirror that of the
United States. Hence, it sought to resemble—as historian Christopher Gerteis compared—
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal.” The developments in Japan regarding labor
policies provided the basis for such organizations to construct what SCAP as well as the
overseers back in Washington would deem as a tolerable labor movement.
While the postwar labor movement was in its nascent stage, it was unfair to assume its
early days encountered failures. Railway workers, seamen, and “the communist-led Sanbetsu”
garnered successes in the October 1946 strikes. They were able to secure increases “in wages for
the workers in the private sector of industry.” 37 This symbolized one of the successes in which
workers and politically-aligned organizations were able to lead successful strikes and have their
demands met. In order to garner the same levels of mobilization and successes, organizers in
Miike years later understood the need for both participation of miners within the coal industry
and the backing of political organizations. As a result, this strategy would nationalize their cause
to the populace and incorporated a political character, both running counter to Sōdōmei’s
aforementioned principles.
Regardless of the necessity for mass participation and support for labor organizations,
different political orientations complicated desires for solidarity in cases such as that of the
Miike strike. With SCAP and American labor organizations exercising influence in Japan, it was
important to ensure surveillance over those with communist tendencies. By fall 1947, the policy
of SCAP’s Labor Division was to establish Democratic Leagues (Mindō), cells within Japanese
unions that espoused anticommunist tendencies. Richard L. G. Deverall, SCAP’s Military
Government Labor Officer for Miyagi Prefecture, indicated in a letter to the AFL’s foreign
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policy unit Free Trade Union Committee how this provided the opportunity to “‘feed [unions]
educational material and ideas’” in order to spread a progressive conscious of the Communists’
“totalitarian rule.’” 38 As a fervent anticommunist and aware of labor’s successes, Deverall’s
campaign of developing “anticommunist, pro-trade union factions” spread across Japan. Mindō
embodied his mission within Japan’s union members to inform the undemocratic and
unprogressive dangers of communism.
Deverall’s campaigns were anticommunist in nature and discussed what he thought were
crucial elements to the business of labor union. Similar to the goals of the AFL and CIO, he
wanted unions in Japan to emulate American labor policy and union practices. “[Deverall]
discussed all manner of union operations, from the functions of administrative bureaucracy to the
purpose and means of providing workers’ education programs.” 39 Deverall had limited
communications in the Japanese language but he employed Nishio Kaneharu to translate.
Deverall’s ultimate goal was to educate union members on the importance of a bureaucracy, or a
governing structure of the union. The issue important to him was securing anticommunist
leadership because the 1946 strikes succeeded in granting concessions to supposed communists
within the labor rank-and-file. Once a functioning bureaucracy was established, education
programs could be provided to disseminate labor policy and tactics. Such education opened a
platform for the anticommunist bureaucracy to promote Deverall’s ideas and consolidating
Mindō internally.
With Mindō, Deverall was a step closer toward formulating an ideal union in the image
of an idealized American union. He urged Japanese unions to participate in collective bargaining
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while simultaneously continuing to espouse his rhetoric. He believed that the unions should only
be concerned on economic issues and dissuade themselves from partaking in any political
struggle. It was not ideal for a union to engage in the latter, which was acceptable terrain for
political parties. 40 Obviously, Deverall’s work for anticommunism was politically itself
motivated, and ironically, part of his strategy was claiming that it was essential to separate
working conditions and labor concerns from politics. Acknowledging some union members’
orientations in the strikes, he wanted to stress what a union should and should not be engaging
in. One of this was avoiding any sort of political struggle, and it was certainly unacceptable when
it involved the Communists. The labor movement should focus solely on achieving better wages
and working conditions instead of pushing for political and economic instability.
Efforts to promote anticommunism halted temporarily once Japan’s domestic situation
experienced two crises. The trajectory of empowering the American-backed anticommunist
forces in the unions halted temporarily amidst deteriorating economic conditions and resulting
political upheaval. In 1947, the chief of SCAP’s Labor Division, James Killen, noted unchecked
inflation became the focal point for Japanese workers. At the same time, the government under
socialist Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu had to compromise his party’s program because he
struggled to maintain support from the conservative parties in his coalition. 41 With increasing
concerns from a worsening economic conditions and a potentially divided government, the
situation was ripe for labor unrest. Killen acknowledged the project had come to a halt. More
importantly, he was concerned about the possibility of a resurgence of supposed communist
tendencies, thereby practically undoing efforts to shift the balance of power to conservative and
pro-trade forces.
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Even if labor organizations were confident in their abilities to demand successfully better
wages and working conditions from employers, the biggest obstacle they faced were business
and government anxieties, from the American occupation forces in particular. William Draper,
the undersecretary of the Army, shared a view with the Industrial Club of Japan that labor unrest
was “the most serious impediment” to the country’s economic recovery. 42 Like Deverall, Draper
was keenly aware about the successes of the 1946 strikes and the current economic situation. The
Japanese business community such as the members of the Industrial Club were also aware of the
vitality of the labor movement. Hence, economic recovery provided a justification for the
business community to oppose the strikers. A successful movement would hinder economic
recovery regardless of its magnitude. As for Draper and members of the Occupation forces, it
provided a geopolitical premise in which they sought to counter unwanted forces from within the
country.
Geopolitics enabled the United States to prioritize its interests in Japan so that labor
would not have the power to hinder economic recovery. In the minds of the Occupation forces,
attacks on the labor movement, a politically motivated gesture, were justifiable on economic
grounds. George Kennan, a Cold War strategist, indicated Japan’s vulnerability to “Soviet-aided
communist subversion owing to her weak economy and unstable government.” The latter was
making efforts to purge politicians who took part in World War II, decentralize the police, and
deconcentrate large companies (zaibatsu). 43 The Occupation forces wanted to prevent the Soviet
Union and communist forces from taking advantage of a country whose government was
implementing policies that countered their interests. Such policies would further weaken Japan’s
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position to prevent its containment. They believed Japan could fall to the Soviet Bloc with a
weak economy that solidified an environment favorable to the labor movement.
The odds of a successful labor movement were waning as the discussion focused on
geopolitics and ideological paranoia. Such emphasis on economic recovery enabled Occupation
forces to continue justifying their presence in Japan against the supposed threats from
communism. Draper indicated that this program “was part of the [American] military and
political strategy against world communism.” It was an assurance to the United States Congress
of the growing need to assist Japan through recovery aid. 44 Draper recognized he needed to
convince Congress to counteract communism with aid. Japan’s supposed economic vulnerability
and proximity to the Soviet Union were crucial factors in the American strategy in East Asian
geopolitics. The fact that the Japanese economy took on a geopolitical importance suggested
American policy continued to sway Japanese economic policy. Furthermore, the counterforce
against labor also continued to grow as the previously reformed-minded SCAP took the stance of
business interests. 45
Eventually, the Red Purge would signal a growing conflict and paranoia against
employees, particularly those in the public sector. The effects from policies seeking to prevent a
supposed threat of communism were evident, especially the government’s vulnerability to
communist elements. In May 1950, “MacArthur accused the Communist Party of being ‘the
agent of international aggression’…the Red Purge involved many more journalists and also led
to the dismissal of 11,000 employees in the private sector of the economy and of 12,000 public
employees.” 46 While the Communist Party was the primary target of the purge, it was not limited

Tsuzuki, Pursuit of Power, 370.
Price, Japan Works, 38.
46
Tsuzuki, Pursuit of Power, 374.
44
45

29
to politicians. Journalists and employees were also targets for their supposed tendencies of
radicalism and communism. This demonstrated the government prioritized dismissing public
employees because they constructed and implemented policies affecting economic recovery. For
those in the media, journalism provided a valuable but vulnerable space to influence public
opinion. It was necessary to prevent a weak government and the dissemination of communist
ideas from falling under the strength of such supposed tendencies.
Considerations to curb the right to strike were present even when such policies ran
counter with SCAP’s wishes. With concerns of militant tendencies growing within the labor
movement, there were contrasting opinions on granting labor rights in general. Blaine Hoover,
the chief of the Civil Service Division of Government Section, proposed subjecting civil servants
to the National Public Service Law (NPSL) rather than the Trade Union Law, with the latter
curbing union rights. 47 While government workers had the liberty under the former law to strike,
the revision of the latter law would outright strip such rights. It was critical for Hoover to suggest
this because of the continued threat of political and economic instability. Taking lessons from the
1946 strikes and their militant tendencies, for anticommunists, it was a gamble not worth risking.
At this point, his ideas ran counter to initial Occupation policy in allowing workers to strike
despite SCAP making moves toward a pro-business stance.
Even though Hoover’s plan received endorsements from MacArthur, it did not have fully
support from other government officials. The move to reclassify civil servants to a more
restrictive law raised questions on the viability of the anticommunist movement. In response to
reclassifying communications workers, assistant labor secretary and former CIO organizer John
W. Gibson viewed the move as “a travesty.” He feared that it “would discredit Mindō leaders”
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and the communists would be able to regain control of the labor movement. 48 Coming from a
labor background himself, Gibson was wary about curbing labor rights. He knew it was a move
necessary to counter supposed communists in Japan’s labor organizations. However, the move
raised questions on the credibility of Mindō leaders, which would foster potential distrust among
union members. In his view, this distrust would give the latter justifications for returning to or
aligning themselves with the Communists, thereby discrediting the anticommunist mission.
Adding onto disagreements of curbing labor rights, the institution of civil service in Japan
was debated. This was true on the aforementioned issue Hoover raised. “To Killen, Hoover was a
narrow technician attempting to implement an American type of civil service without
recognizing the peculiar conditions within Japan, particularly the greater role of the national
government as employer.” 49 With more familiarity with the Japanese political apparatus and
labor relations, Killen criticized Hoover, even his basic credentials, for suggesting having a civil
service modeled after the United States. The difference between them was Killen had more
familiarity with Japan’s civil service and the importance of government employment. However,
it seemed Killen was unaware that the AFL, CIO, and Deverall sought to implement labor
policies akin to American labor laws and union organization.
While public employees were being subjected to reconsiderations about their right to
strike, anticommunists were intensifying their activities and influence within the movement.
“The purges of the left-wing unionists were accompanied by SCAP and Japanese government
promotion of Mindō and other anti-communists who thus were enabled to take over union
leadership. Of course, the union movement was divided and weakened by these
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developments.” 50 The influence of Mindō and anticommunist union factions were gaining
traction during a time of economic and political uncertainty. Promotions of anticommunists in
union leadership positions enabled a change of direction where cooperation with management
was key, something that Sōdōmei sought.
The impact of technology on labor signified a company’s willingness to increase output,
placing laborers at an impasse. One of the premises of having a labor movement in the first place
was to counter in part the increasing use of industrial technologies in the workplace. Alongside
industrial rationalization, laborers were at a disadvantage because technology was replacing
them, thereby losing their “autonomous skill basis and shop-floor solidarity.” 51 While the early
1950s preceded the economic boom, there was a sense of uncertainty for manual labor. The
integration of technological practices in the workplace unburdened companies from utilizing
labor resources in many areas to maximize output. It was indicative for management to consider
new production strategies. It certainly benefited the company, but it also led to discontent among
laborers whose livelihoods may depend solely on manual labor. Regardless of the company’s
economic or political motivations, technological innovation was an ongoing trend that mobilized
discontent and political upheaval among those affected.
Even for the same anticommunist members in the unions, militancy was still an issue.
Despite anticommunists and American officials in Japan continuing to exert influence over labor
affairs, it was not easy to control the unions, their members, and their activities entirely. Late
1949 and early 1950 saw a “resurgence of union militancy” from the anticommunist unions
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Japanese
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left’s more moderate Socialist Party. This raised alarm among SCAP and American labor leaders
when there were suggestions about a proposed general strike in March 1950. 52 The strategy of
having anticommunist unions assuming the direction of the labor movement halted again. While
Occupation authorities thought these groups would be friendly to Japan’s business community,
not to mention in alignment with the country’s geopolitical significance in the Cold War, the
resurgence of labor militancy was a concerning development that would destabilize Yoshida
Shigeru’s conservative government. However, to the relief of the authorities, this was thwarted
with SCAP and the government intervening. 53
While the government sought to influence Sōhyō and promote anticommunist elements in
the union, the political situation was precarious, especially with growing discontent with the
government. The effort to influence Sōhyō as a force against communism and align itself with
the ICFTU came at a standstill. With Yoshida’s government implementing an increased amount
of anti-labor policies, it provided the impetus for Sōhyō’s left wing to lead the movement. 54 A
growing disillusionment was taking place where the movement’s left wing acknowledged that
the government was not on its side. With the government curbing labor rights for civil servants,
they saw the necessity to attempt to retake leadership of the movement from Mindō and
anticommunists. Such anti-labor policies enabled union members in the private sector to be
disillusioned with the possibility of having their rights curbed as well.
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Chapter 3. Division within Notions of Geopolitics
The current political environment, with the government implementing anti-labor laws,
forced the labor movement to reconsider its strategies. The recent events of the Red Purge
required labor to propose new strategies and alter its messaging in order to avoid accusations of
radical and communist tendencies. Labor radicals were in disarray while Sōhyō and the socialists
were largely unaffected. Their campaigns for peace continued in the early 1950s when labor
achieved stabilization, with the exception being “the unions in declining industries such as coal
mining.” 55 For labor, stabilization meant nonviolent cooperation with management while
demanding for better wages and working conditions. This signified a schism within the
movement between those willing to cooperate and those who sought continued or other means of
demanding the same goals. Since the movement took a political character in the aftermath of the
1946 strikes, it was essential for Sōhyō and other organizations such as Sōdōmei to distance
themselves from those espousing “radical” elements.
While the Red Purge certainly placed the left-leaning union members on high alert, it was
not immediately implemented. American influence on the anticommunist campaign further
divided anticommunist and communist elements. The Red Purge enabled SCAP to endorse the
anticommunist Sōhyō as an alternative for unions to align themselves instead of remaining with
the Sanbetsu-dominant Zenrōren. Those who remained with the latter were vulnerable to the
purges and labeled as “Communists.” 56 SCAP and the government gave unions such as those in
the automobile and metals industries the opportunity to align themselves with Sōhyō. It is
important to note the fluidity of “political identities” in the eyes of the government. They gave
unions the opportunity to realign themselves, which were determinants as to how they would
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view them and their political tendencies. If they remained in the Zenrōren and continued to
“identify” themselves as Communists, they were vulnerable to a purge.
The labor movement took on a geopolitical character that based on a particular view of
Japan’s role in East Asia. The outbreak of the Korean War influenced the direction of Sōhyō
when considering questions on American influence. Initially, Sōhyō was an organization
established with the desire to have a Japanese organization affiliated with the ICFTU back in the
United States. However, American dominance in Japan saw reluctance among union leaders to
affiliate themselves with an organization supporting the conflict and a “partial peace treaty.” 57
The issue union leaders were debating was the organization potentially supporting American
efforts in a conflict across the Sea of Japan. In turn, the question was on the independence of
Sōhyō in the midst of American pressure. In regards to the peace treaty, union leaders pondered
the effects on Japan of engaging in military combat, of being dragged into war by the United
States, even after SCAP promulgated the pacifist constitution in 1947. Such militarization,
according to their minds, ran counter to the constitution’s renunciation of war.
The issue of American hegemony became the basis for Sōhyō’s pacifist orientation.
American influence on Japan in regards to policy, the economy, and the military concerned
Sōhyō greatly. Sōhyō’s political orientation shifted to the left when, in its second convention
held in March 1951, it adopted the “Four Principles of Peace.” The document included the desire
for the country to promulgate an “overall peace treaty,” remain neutral at all costs, oppose
military bases, and oppose rearming the Japanese military. 58 This demonstrated Sōhyō’s position
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as a political force, something Deverall and others had opposed. In the context of the Cold War,
their pacifist stance was clear when the Korean War broke out. While Sōhyō was initially
anticommunist, it realized how much influence American authorities were exerting and
determining not just Japanese labor policies but foreign policies as well. Japan’s militarization
represented a change in direction in the geopolitical dynamics of the day, and the labor
organization was fearful about what this meant for Japan and for themselves.
In early 1951, Sōhyō elected prominent labor leader Takano Minoru from the leftsocialist wing as its general secretary. However, not all members accepted him immediately.
Some Sōhyō members were suspicious of him because he frequently contacted officials at
SCAP’s Labor Division who sought to affiliate Sōhyō with the ICFTU and perceived him as
“fundamentally pro-American in orientation.” 59 Despite Takano’s ideological credentials and
experience in the labor movement, the skepticism from Sōhyō members of the newly elected
general secretary presented members a sense uncertainty because of his connections with
American authorities. For the ICFTU, it had been pushing for Sōhyō’s affiliation with the
organization. This would translate into a potential disregard for the “Four Principles of Peace,”
something that he took no part in such discussions. He eventually overcame such suspicions later
on.
With the new positions Sōhyō maintained, it was clear unity would be difficult to
achieve. While Sōhyō remained suspicious of Takano’s ties to the United States, he sought to
reiterate the organization’s stance in regards to its place in a wider political context. The Peace
Promotion People’s Conference, established in 1951 and linked with the Socialist Party and other
organizations in civil society, advocated for a “positive neutralist position.” However, the issue
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generating controversy was the participation of labor federations “as a unit or independently on a
federation-by-federation basis.” 60 The problem Sōhyō faced was the question on organizational
participation in maintaining a “positive neutralist position.” It is worth mentioning the continuing
divisions in Sōhyō’s position in Japanese politics. Whether or not anticommunist forces had
influence in the issue was uncertain. However, the fact that individual federations held
conflicting opinions on the role of neutrality signified the ensuing precariousness of taking action
as a collective.
Clearly, Takano needed a strategy to advance his endeavors within Sōhyō. While
problems of unity did continue to plague the organization, it did not prevent Takano from
aspiring to rally the organization and the labor movement in general. One initiative he undertook
was to establish district councils in which he gained “access to a broader network independent of
the system of industrial federations” that Sōhyō had relied on. 61 He acknowledged industrial
federations were extremely powerful in decision-making for their subordinate trade unions.
Whenever he proposed something the organization should undertake, his main opposition would
certainly come from these federations. Their power was far more influential than individual trade
unions. For him, it was essential to establish district councils in order to directly appeal to the
trade unions. Hence, it was an effort to sideline the intermediary. He hoped not only to speak to
trade unions directly but also to integrate trade unions directly into the organization’s direction.
The idea of neutrality proved to be a precarious endeavor, especially during a time of war
and the ongoing contest for ideological hegemony. While Takano was mobilizing Sōhyō and the
neutralist line he promoted, divisions remained along not only ideological but also policy lines.
Reestablished in July 1951, Sōdōmei became the opposing force to Sōhyō and advocated for a
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“‘partial’ peace treaty” and supported the security treaty with the United States as the only
practical solution to Japan’s situation in the context of the international political situation at the
time.” 62 Those who were dissatisfied with Sōhyō’s line of thinking vis-à-vis foreign policy
thought it would be necessary to call for organizational independence and support the status quo.
In the context of the Cold War and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, it was crucial
for Japan to support the United States in order to prevent the spread of communism. A “‘partial’
peace treaty” signified a potential for military mobilization while having the security treaty with
the United States provide defense for Japan.
Even far-left Socialist union members with ties to the Communist Party were aware of
the changing strategies. It was apparent that American officials in both Tōkyō and Washington
were “appalled by Takano’s apparent hijacking of the anticommunist initiative.” The outbreak of
the Korean War provided MacArthur justifications to “ban the Communist Party” and continue
the crackdowns on leftist activists. 63 As Takano was leading the Sōhyō, he knew the purges
specifically targeted those who the government deemed as “radical” and had ties to the
Communist Party. It was an ironic situation where SCAP and the government were expecting
leftist activists to advocate for militancy and espouse communist tendencies. Regardless of
leftists distancing themselves from “radical” messaging, they and those affiliated with the
Communist Party continued to be targeted through the start of the Korean War.
During the Occupation-era of American dominance of Japan, American officials sought
to influence labor policy, activities, and sentiments of unions. The end of the Occupation era
signified a turning point for the labor movement with a growing awareness of American
geopolitics in the region. In 1952, President Harry S. Truman ended the Allied Occupation, and
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Japan regained its independence as the result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Takano took
advantage of the situation to “renew publication of propaganda criticizing American imperialist
ambitions in East Asia.” 64 The end of the Occupation signified a potential end of American
influence in the labor movement. This new environment provided a platform for Takano and
like-minded leaders to further construct a geopolitical platform. Such a platform espoused antiAmerican sentiment, including protest against American geopolitical hegemony during a time of
Cold War competition. For Takano, it was a sign of relief where they were not subject to purges
and curbs on labor rights. While it was true Occupation ended, the anticommunist campaign left
a legacy that weighed on the minds of labor for decades after.
The legacy of the Occupation era met with hostility, especially when the United States
continued to exert its influence in East Asia. With the Americans out of Japan and the Korean
War brewing, a new landscape emerged, placing the labor movement into the geopolitics and
ethnic nationalism of the time. Kevin Doak, an East Asia scholar, argued that North Korea’s
invasion of the South led the Japanese left to approach ethnic nationalism as a means to criticize
capitalism in Japan and “cultural colonialism” of the United States’ imperialist ambitions in the
midst of “anticommunist backlash.” 65 Due to perceived efforts by the United States to impose
capitalism and “cultural colonialism” on the country, Japanese labor incorporated an ethnic
nationalist character. Previously associated with Japanese colonial endeavors during World War
II, it provided the basis for the left to criticize capitalism and American imperialism. The former
was a reaction to worsening labor conditions as demonstrated in the 1946 strikes and early
1950s. The latter was aiming at the United States’ growing hegemony in the region despite Japan
freed from its former adversary in World War II.
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The issue of labor in the Cold War context remained fresh in the aftermath of the
Occupation. The efforts of American authorities constructing Japan’s labor relations put into
question whether to transfer decision-making on the labor movement to Japanese hands. Deverall
noted that the left was endangering “liberalized” labor-management relations and the economic
gains it achieved. More importantly, it “threatened the independence of the ethnic-national
essence of Japan.” 66 While Deverall at this point had little influence and his ideas had little
impact on the movement itself, he felt it was necessary to prevent the left from dictating union
activities. In his view, labor-management relations were satisfactory because American
authorities managed to “liberalize” Japan’s economy. He knew very well that the left changed
their messaging to include ethnic nationalism to discredit the efforts the United States had done
for the country. Ironically, he constructed his concerns using a concept that had negative
connotations during the wartime era and tied it to the positive developments of the postwar
economy.
While Deverall would be disappointed in a potential dismantling of an Americaninfluenced economy and labor relations, his belief was at odds with Japanese labor’s desires for
the country’s neutrality. Sōhyō’s political shift to the left continued and aligned itself with likeminded socialists outside of Japan. Under Takano, his attendance at the January 1953 Asian
Socialist Conference in Rangoon (present-day Yangon) signified “international legitimation for
the anti-US neutralism that they were pursuing.” 67 Adhering to the “Four Principles of Peace,”
Sōhyō sought to advocate for a neutral Japan in which the country will not subjugated under
American hegemony. On the international stage, Takano and his colleagues sought to position
the organization as a beacon for peace independent of the Cold War’s hegemonic powers. With
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other socialists across the continent participating in the conference, there was another alternative
to American geopolitical subjugation.
While neutrality was a crucial part in Sōhyō’s debate on Japan’s position on the global
stage, it generated controversy in which countries were supposedly committed to peace. The
aspiration for Japan to become neutral was short-lived, especially when Sōhyō had to deal with
internal divisions that were to come. Within the Socialist Party, Takano urged a “peace force”
which depicted the United States “as a warlike force and the Soviet Union and Communist China
as forces of peace.” 68 Despite continuing the rhetoric for peace deriving from Sōhyō’s principles,
he took a more assertive stance by naming which countries were “peaceful.” Japanese labor’s
experiences under SCAP and the Yoshida government’s adherence to American authorities
motivated Takano to question the United States’ commitment to peace. In the end, he identified
the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China as countries committed to peace. This
assessment did not sit well with other members of Sōhyō.
Divisions not only linked to political matters but also the current direction was more
concerning to others. Even as Takano was pursuing anti-American rhetoric during the Cold War,
political divisions were still present. Younger social democrats in the textile workers’, seamen’s,
broadcasting workers’, and theater workers’ unions published a manifesto arguing Sōhyō’s
“economic demands” were unattainable unless the economic structure was “in better shape than
it was at the time.” Furthermore, they argued Sōhyō’s current direction made it more difficult to
resolve labor disputes. 69 The point of contention within Sōhyō was the unviability of Sōhyō’s
“economic demands.” In other words, it was the organizational structure and Takano’s policies
that received tremendous scrutiny. In the view of Takano’s opponents, his focus on political
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matters was ineffective in resolving labor disputes at home. Rather, the economic situation for
workers and employees needed prioritization over political and ideological ambitions. Therefore,
it was necessary to steer the direction towards economic matters, which Sōdōmei pursued.
The problem of Sōhyō as a political entity became the mainstream issue in organizational
affairs. Internal pressure in Sōhyō intensified on questions of economic solutions and political
engagement. Ōta Kaoru, the president of the synthetic chemical workers’ union, issued a policy
statement arguing Sōhyō’s direction as an economic and political force posed a sense of
confusion among the rank-and-file because the organization’s original aims were supposed to
focus on the former matters. 70 Ōta was disappointed in the fact that Takano prioritized political
aims over advocating for ordinary workers and employees. Like the aforementioned younger
social democrats, Sōhyō was supposed to be a force for the rank-and-file to advocate for better
working conditions and wage increases. However, these developments obstructed the labor
movement’s cause because the Takano years had shifted the organization to become a political
force. Ōta feared that Takano had taken Sōhyō in a wrong direction which would make the rankand-file antagonistic to continue their membership.
A new strategy for the labor movement required consideration in order for bargaining to
be effective in the midst of weakness. The divisions placed Sōhyō in a precarious situation where
weakness took hold on bargaining rights and other labor issues. Shuntō, the comprehensive and
coordinated spring bargaining by labor, was a strategy which was “designed to compensate for
structural weakness of enterprise unions in wage bargaining.” Its strategy was to impose
uniformity “and a cross-firm and cross-industry referencing structure as a substitute for the
organizational structure found in a bona fide industrial union.” 71 Labor leaders were frustrated
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with the ineffectiveness of Sōhyō in the area of bargaining. This was not to say labor leaders
abandoned the organization outright. Rather, they hoped Shuntō would provide a hand for crossindustrial cooperation with a structure different from a typical industrial union. This also
provided an opportunity to unite weaker enterprise unions, something not considered given the
state of Sōhyō’s internal divisions on strategy.
The premise of labor organizing and activism was a participatory movement that sought
to strengthen the position of workers. The developments of the mid-1950s reflected change to the
sociopolitical atmosphere with Shuntō. It was a national effort to coordinate “annual wage
negotiations.” Most of the bargaining was done at an individual level, and Shuntō provided an
opportunity to nationalize the labor movement, which the Japan scholar Ronald Dore coined the
“‘brother should help brother’ ideology.” Unions were to capitalize on such activities in order to
get an upper hand on negotiations with management to increase wages. 72
Internal divisions of Sōhyō enabled discussions on the inclusion of a new organizational
force. The establishment of Zenrō, made up of right-wing unions, and its influence in the labor
movement raised concerns on affiliation with the ICFTU. Martin Bolle, the ICFTU delegate to
Japan, was skeptical about supporting Zenrō because it would hinder the ICFTU’s attempts to
have Sōhyō aligned with it. Others urged Zenrō to affiliate instead. 73 At the time, Zenrō
membership was significantly smaller than Sōhyō, about a quarter of the latter. It was
unsurprising that Bolle expressed concerns on shifting labor’s national center to an organization
that did not necessarily represent all union members. However, others saw Zenrō as an
organization capable of shifting labor’s political orientation away from the left and more to the
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business-friendly right. Nevertheless, the fact remained the position of a labor organization
within the national movement proved to be critical for ICFTU.
The divisions within the labor movement were a liability in regards to the right to strike.
Despite the ideological divisions within the labor movement, the ICFTU thought it would be
crucial for the movement to unite. The ICFTU’s Director of Organization Charles Millard
indicated at a meeting with ICFTU-affiliated unions that he sought to promote unity among the
trade unions. He argued it was the only solution “against government oppression and it would be
essential to make the ICFTU’s assistance effective.” 74 The organization saw such developments
as hindering its desire to make their assistance effective. In order to do so, Sōhyō and Zenrō
needed to settle their ideological differences and resist government oppression. Whatever
government oppression may mean for the ICFTU it was clear the task required unity of union
members. Trade unions were struggling for their right to strike amidst the government curbing
such in the previous years, and their opposition to the government would prove to be effective.
The ICFTU did not have to look far in convincing Sōhyō to align with it. Divisions
within the labor movement provided Zenrō the opportunity to exert its influence in competition
with Sōhyō. The former was able to cooperate with employers on advancing technical innovation
and formed “second unions” against Sōhyō’s “first unions;” the latter opposed productivity
improvements. 75 Zenrō’s influence seems reminiscent of the divisions that compromised the
success of the Miike strikers years later. Zenrō was willing to cooperate with companies to
ensure there were improvements in productivity and to some degree have an upper hand in labor
negotiations. Technical innovation was something the organization was willing to agree with
management, in contrast to Sōhyō. This development signified further fragmentation within the
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movement in which the power dynamics shifted from a more hostile to a business-friendly
organization. This aimed to increase opposition to Sōhyō.
While there was internal strife within the labor movement, Japanese executives came
together to find ways to counteract unions. The issue of productivity was one that involved
international connections, especially with Japan’s former occupier. Between 1955 and 1961, the
United States held “productivity tours” for Japanese corporate executives to participate. Lasting
for a few weeks, these provided them opportunities to witness American technological
innovation and “management methods.” 76 These tours were designed for Japanese executives to
discuss ways in which they would increase production without dealing with a hostile workforce
back home. In the wake of the famous 1959 Kitchen Debate between Nikita Khrushchev and
Richard Nixon—where the latter argued his country’s technological ideal of a suburban
home 77—it was crucial to demonstrate to the executives that technology and America’s
conceptions of management were the ideal. Hence, productivity rested on the ability to continue
minimizing the use of labor despite labor’s ensuing divisions.
The postwar era ushered an environment of organizational mergers, especially on the
economic stage. Such developments saw strategies of mobilization should conflict arise. In the
labor movement, “Sōhyō played a role in achieving socialist unity.” 78 At the same time, business
groups such as Nikkeiren, Keidanren, the Economic Fellowship Association, and the Japan
Chamber of Commerce were advocating for politically conservative unity. 79 This marked a
reorganization of forces that paved the way for competition in the fight for better wages and
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working conditions. While there was disunity in the ranks of labor, as mentioned above, it was
pivotal for labor to unite other labor forces despite threats of the Red Purge lingering. For the
business camp, calls for unity of their own were reactions to these developments. While the
government had backed the business community to eliminate supposed radical elements in their
respective sectors, they sought an even greater force to deal with labor.
Cooperation between business and government proved to be beneficial and able to
prevent economic disruptions from hostile labor. A unified stand against militant labor unions
was able to close whatever struggle existed. The mission of the American-tied Japan Productivity
Center (JPC) was to assist management in improving worker productivity and labor-management
relations. As a result, it was able to bridge cooperation between corporate managers and
government bureaucrats for the sake of managing productivity. In the mid-1960s, labor leaders
were working under the same Labor Ministry bureaucrats’ guidelines. 80 At this point, the space
for labor militancy was almost nonexistent. The 1960 strike failed, the credibility of the unions
and their leaders deteriorated, and management was able to be the powerful force in labormanagement relations. In regards to productivity, it was necessary for the JPC to continue
uniting anti-labor forces to prevent labor an advantage, especially when the demand of coal
continued on a decline.
The JPC was able to overshadow hopes for the labor movement to revamp its legitimacy.
In tandem of removing the power of labor organizations and trade unions, it hoped to shift the
power balance of labor-management relations, resulting in a less recalcitrant environment for
cooperation. The JPC ran a campaign from its establishment on February 14, 1955 appealing
trade unions to minimize unemployment in order to increase productivity, cooperate with
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management to construct plans for such, and distribute any gains between “management,
workers, and consumer.” 81 Even though Sōhyō was very skeptical of the JPC, the fact remained
that the 1960s provided little space for hostility. Prime Minister Ikeda’s “income doubling”
policies sought to concentrate on economic growth and institute social welfare. 82 The odds
against Sōhyō were too much to bear. Zenrō and the JPC envisioned increased productivity as
the solution in salvaging employment despite having to concede.
The developments to discredit Sōhyō and the labor movement accelerated as internal
divisions became increasingly inevitable. Since decision-making regarding labor-management
relations was situated at the enterprise level, enterprise unions had the liberty to disregard
“directives from militant industrial federations and adopt a moderate stance.” This cannot be said
for the reverse because militancy required industrial solidarity. Economic growth also favored
moderate stances. 83 The program of economic growth was crucial in understanding the
moderation of trade unions because the rank-and-file would not see the relevance of resorting to
militancy. While the labor organizations continued to promote this idea despite the humiliating
defeat of the Miike strike, trade unions thought it was crucial to cooperate with management in
order to continue reaping the benefits of economic growth. This permanently fractured solidarity
using militant means regardless of political will.
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Conclusion
The episode of the Miike strike of 1960 and Japan’s labor movement in the postwar era
demonstrated the extent of the fragmentation of Japan’s labor movement. Featured in Hiroko
Kumagai’s documentary Echoes from the Miike Mine is Matsuo Keikō whose husband was
involved in Miike’s Sōhyō-backed first union. She reiterated the resentment she felt against the
business-friendly second union, some of whom were her former friends. She was distraught that
her husband received no compensation inflicted by the 1963 explosion at the mine for his
respiratory injuries. Yamashita Kazuji, a member of the rival second union, described his
reasoning for joining the union because he needed money for his family, and the first union
threatened to prevent the miners’ family members from employment. 84 Both participants in the
labor movement showed the different reactions in solving mass dismissals of miners. While the
Cold War and geopolitics certainly played a key role in undermining efforts in the labor
movement prior to 1960, labor was not homogenous in strategy and belief. A sense of resentment
lingered in the first union, as exemplified by Matsuo’s views, while Esaki Hiroshi, a striker in
the second union, had a different obligation to fellow miners who had different priorities.
A fundamental issue that unions faced was their involvement in politics. While the labor
movement was successful in achieving demands in the 1946 strikes, it had varying levels of
success in collective bargaining, demonstrating skepticism of its effectiveness in the long term.
In a lecture by Takita Minoru, a union member in the textile industry, the social influence of
unions was extremely limited and did not have the ability to change current policies. Instead, he
suggested uniting private sector unions to achieve that. 85 The problem that persisted through
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Japan’s postwar experience in labor relations was the tremendous lack of unity. This was
reasonable because not all trade unions in different industries had the same demands. Miike
strikers had different demands than those in Takita’s. The case in point was the skepticism of a
union’s influence on swaying management and labor policy in general. A more effective
response to pressure management and government would be to unite private sector unions as a
collective, something he criticized unions for failing to do.
Takita’s assessment of disunity in the Miike strike was accurate. The problem that was in
the minds of the first union strikers during Miike was the potential crackdown on them to end the
strike. According to Ōta’s analysis, strikers feared police intervention while the CLRC attempted
to mediate. He acknowledged the worries of many strikers for their safety and the possibility of
forcefully agreeing on mediation. 86 For many strikers, the action of striking was increasingly
dangerous because Mitsui management and the police would use any means to discredit their
demands and suppress their movement. Ōta knew that the CLRC were friendly with management
and the government so he sought to minimize mediation as much as possible. However, he did
recognize mediation was potentially the only option Sōhyō had because the situation was
unattainable for labor. The labor movement only held a few strands of unity, and some of the
rank-and-file felt there was no sense of solidarity to begin with. 87
The timing of the Miike strike coincided with the precariousness of the coal industry to
be competitive against the oil industry. However, the issue of dismissals exposed an internal
struggle in the labor movement in general. For instance, the Mitsui White Collar Employees
Federation and another dissident faction were so dissatisfied with the Miike union that they
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sought to bargain with management independently. 88 A strike may send a signal to management
on the miners’ dissatisfaction with labor practices, working conditions, or other issues. In this
case, voluntary retirement was a misnomer for dismissals and the solution sought by labor was
the rescinding of over a thousand notices. The problem was other miners did not see the
relevance of planning an outright strike and sought other means to have management grant some
concessions. This meant the power dynamics rested in favor of management and government
forces.
Japan’s defeat in World War II allowed a place for the United States to expand its sphere
of influence, especially pertaining to Japan’s labor policies. The failures of the Miike strike and
the divisions within the movement were rooted in American efforts during the Occupation era to
promote anticommunism. Despite Deverall’s lack of comprehensive success in disseminating his
campaign in Japanese, through his staff translator Shibata Michio, he reiterated to workers that
Communists posed a threat to the free trade union movement as well as the country’s
democracy. 89 In a time of immense strife between Soviet and American hegemonic spheres, it
was not surprising that the latter sought to construct Japan’s labor policies and activities. Tying
democracy to the free trade union movement ensured that anticommunism was a just cause. Not
only did his campaign go through great strength to convince Japanese workers to disdain
communism and supposed radical union members, it also brought division that would paralyze
the labor movement in the aftermath of the Occupation.
With the Cold War in full force, Japanese labor leaders debated on the mission of the
labor movement within this new geopolitical environment. The direction of Sōhyō and its place
within East Asian geopolitics was a controversial move that further paralyzed its role in the labor
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movement. The Democratic Labor Movement Liaison Council (Minrōren) was an organization
within Sōhyō that was dissatisfied with the approval of Takano’s labor program tied to the Anpo,
which shifted the organization away from labor issues. This represented “a brazen abnegation of
fundamental principles of union organization and behavior.” 90 Like Ōta, Minrōren felt Sōhyō’s
direction of solidarity among socialists in Asia was the wrong step. Not only was Sōhyō’s
original purpose as an advocate for labor rights questioned, Takano integrated a political
component into its program. Existing divisions within the labor movement now solidified
ideology, something that the rank-and-file and other like-minded leaders had no interest in.
The years following Japan’s defeat in World War II generated a space for the war-torn
economy to revive itself with initial help from its former adversary the United States. In the
process, a labor movement was beginning to understand its role within this new context.
However, the country was prone to hegemonic forces that became the cornerstone for the Cold
War. The United States promoted anticommunism, which placed the “radically-minded” labor
leaders on edge during the Red Purge.
There was a curbing of labor rights as in the case of the public sector where espousing
“communist” tendencies was prohibited. The labor movement’s position was one that had to
adhere to Occupation authorities who initially were in favor of a flourishing movement. Even
though Occupation ended in 1952, divisions in the labor movement proved to be a major threat
to solidarity long thereafter, especially when a national organization such as Sōhyō became less
of a labor organization than a political one.
The debates on strategies to unite the movement were unsuccessful as more workers and
employees were increasingly frustrated, and divisions became inevitable overtime. While it was
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true that divisions led to the failure of the Miike strike, it was a time when labor attempted to
understand their role within a fast-growing economy within the context of the Cold War. One
must not underestimate how labor leaders desired to represent the workers and employees
through advocating for increased wages, better working conditions, upholding labor rights, and
bargaining with management.
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